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Due to resource constraints of the sensor nodes, traditional public key cryptographic techniques are not
feasible in most sensor network architectures. Several symmetric key distribution mechanisms are proposed for
establishing pairwise keys between sensor nodes in sensor networks, but most of them are not scalable and also
are not much suited for mobile sensor networks because they incur much communication as well as computational
overheads. Moreover, these schemes are either vulnerable to a small number of compromised sensor nodes or
involve expensive protocols for establishing keys. In this paper, we introduce a new scheme for establishing keys
between sensor nodes with the help of additional high-end sensor nodes, called the auxiliary nodes. Our scheme
provides unconditional security against sensor node captures and high network connectivity. In addition, our
scheme requires minimal storage requirement for storing keys mainly due to only a single key before deployment
in each node in the sensor network, supports efficiently addition of new nodes after initial deployment and also
works for any deployment topology.
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1. Introduction
In a sensor network, many small computing
nodes are deployed for the purpose of sensing data
and then transmitting the data to nearby base
stations. Public-key cryptosystems are not suited
in such networks because of resource limitations
of the nodes and also due to the vulnerability
of physical captures of the nodes by the enemy.
The symmetric ciphers such as DES [17], AES [4],
RC5 [16] are the viable options for encrypting se-
cret data. However, setting up symmetric keys
among communicating nodes remains a challeng-
ing problem. A survey on sensor networks can be
found in [1].
The topology of the network is in general dy-
namic, because the connectivity among the sensor
nodes may vary with time due to several factors
such as node addition, node departure, and the
possibility of having mobile nodes. In our case,
we assume that the nodes are highly mobile.
Pairwise key establishment between neighbor-
ing sensor nodes in a sensor network is done by
a protocol known as the bootstrapping protocol.
A bootstrapping protocol usually involves several
steps. In the key pre-distribution phase, each sen-
sor node is loaded by a set of pre-distributed keys
in its memory. This is done before deployment of
the sensor nodes in a target field. After deploy-
ment, a direct key establishment (shared key dis-
covery) phase is performed by the nodes in order
to establish direct pairwise keys between them.
Two nodes u and v are called physical neighbors if
they are within the communication ranges of one
another. They are called key neighbors if they
share one or more key(s) in their key rings Ku
and Kv. The nodes u and v can secretly and di-
rectly communicate with one another if and only
if they are both physical and key neighbors. In
this case we call u and v direct neighbors. The
path key establishment phase is an optional stage
and, if executed, adds to the connectivity of the
network. In this phase, a secure path is discov-
21
22 A. K. Das
ered between two physical neighbors and a fresh
pairwise key is sent securely along that path.
The simplest solution is the use of a single mis-
sion key for the entire network. In this case,
each node is given the same mission key be-
fore deployment in the network. After deploy-
ment any two neighbor nodes can communicate
among each other using this key. Unfortunately,
the compromise of even a single node in a net-
work would reveal the secret key and thus al-
low decryption of all network traffic. SPINS [15]
is a protocol to provide pairwise key establish-
ment using the base station as a KDC (key dis-
tribution center). However, this protocol incurs
huge communication overhead and it is also vul-
nerable to single point failure. Several tech-
niques [9], [3], [14], [7], [2] are proposed in the lit-
erature in order to solve the bootstrapping prob-
lem. These schemes are not much suitable for
mobile sensor networks because the bootstrap-
ping procedure involves considerable communica-
tion and computational overheads and can not be
repeated quite often.
The key pre-distribution scheme [5] proposed
for mobile heterogeneous wireless sensor net-
works is an improvement of the Dong and
Liu’s scheme [6]. This scheme supports large-
scale sensor networks and dynamic node addi-
tion efficiently after initial deployment. In this
scheme, each regular sensor node requires to store
equal number of keying information as in other
schemes [9,3,14,6].
In this paper, we propose a new key pre-
distribution mechanism suitable for highly mobile
sensor networks. Our scheme requires minimal
storage requirement due to storing a single key
in each sensor’s memory. Security analysis and
performance evaluation illustrate that our scheme
provides better performance than existing proto-
cols, in terms of network connectivity, key storage
overhead and network resilience against node cap-
ture attacks. Simulation results also demonstrate
that our scheme is highly applicable for mobile
wireless sensor networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we briefly describe the Dong and
Liu’s scheme [6], which can be applied for highly
mobile sensor nodes. Section 3 introduces our
proposed scheme. In Section 4, we give a detailed
analysis of our scheme with respect to network
connectivity, resilience against node captures and
overheads required by a sensor node in order to
establish pairwise keys with its neighbor nodes.
We discuss the simulation results of our scheme in
Section 5. Section 6 compares the performances
of our scheme with the previous schemes. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. Overview of the Dong and Liu’s Scheme
This scheme proposed by Dong and Liu [6] re-
cently, does not depend on the sensors’ location
information and can be used for the sensor net-
works with highly mobile sensor nodes. The main
idea behind their approach is to deploy additional
sensor nodes, called assisting nodes, to help the
pairwise key establishment between sensor nodes
in a sensor network. Thus, they will not be use-
ful for secure node-to-node communication in the
network. The sensor nodes which are not assist-
ing nodes, called as the regular sensor nodes.
In the key pre-distribution phase, before de-
ployment, the base station generates a unique
master key MKu for every sensor node u which
will be shared between u and the base station
only. Every assisting node i will get preloaded
with a hash value H(MKu||i) for every regular
sensor node u, where H is a one-way hash func-
tion (for example, SHA-1 [12]) and ”||” denotes
the concatenation operation. If n is the number
of regular sensor nodes in the network, it is thus
assumed that each assisting node will store all n
hash images.
In the pairwise key establishment phase, after
deployment, every regular sensor node first dis-
covers the assisting nodes as well as other regular
sensor nodes in its communication range. If a reg-
ular sensor node u needs to establish a pairwise
key with its neighbor regular sensor node v, it will
send a request to its every neighbor assisting node
i. The request message includes the IDs of u and
v and will be protected by the key H(MKu||i),
which is already preloaded to the assisting node
i. We note that, in this case, the assisting node
acts as a KDC (key distribution center). After re-
ceiving such a request from u, the assisting node
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i will generate a reply to u. The assisting node
i generates a random key R, makes two copies of
it, one protected by H(MKu||i) (for node u) and
other protected by H(MKv||i) (for node v) and
finally sends these two protected copies to node
u. Node u then gets R by decrypting the pro-
tected R using the key H(MKu||i) and forwards
another protected copy of R to node v. Similarly,
node v retrieves R by decrypting the protected R
using the key H(MKv||i). Thus, u will receive a
random key from every neighbor assisting neigh-
bor node. If {R1, R2,. . ., Rl} be such a set of all
these random keys, the final key between u and
v is computed as ku,v = R1⊕ R2⊕ · · · ⊕Rl. We
note that as long as at least one random key is
secure, this final key ku,v will be safe.
It may be possible that a regular sensor node
could not find any assisting sensor node in its
neighborhood. In that case, the supplemental key
establishment phase will be performed, where a
regular sensor node may discover a set of assist-
ing nodes with a certain number of hops in order
establish a pairwise key with its neighbor node.
This scheme guarantees high probability of es-
tablishing keys between regular sensor nodes and
provides better security compared to those for
the EG scheme [9], the q-composite scheme [3],
the random pairwise keys scheme [3] and the
polynomial-pool based scheme [14]. The main
drawback of this scheme is that it does not sup-
port dynamic regular sensor node addition after
initial deployment, which is considered as a very
crucial issue in sensor networks.
3. Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we describe the motivation
behind development of our novel scheme. We
then describe assumptions, notations and various
phases of our scheme.
3.1. Motivation
Our scheme is motivated by the following con-
siderations. In the Dong and Liu’s scheme [6],
it is necessary to store a large number of hash
images of keys of the regular sensor nodes in
each assisting node’s memory. In particular, for
a large-scale sensor network, an assisting node
has thus to store huge number of hash values of
keys of the regular sensor nodes. Moreover, the
assisting nodes are only be used for pairwise key
establishment purpose between regular sensor
nodes and hence they do not helpful for secure
node-to-node communication as well as authenti-
cation in a sensor network. Thus, in case of node
compromising they will not be helpful for secure
communications.
Though their scheme provides high network
connectivity and much better resilience against
node captures than the EG scheme [9], the
q-composite scheme [3], the random pairwise
keys scheme [3] and the polynomial-pool based
scheme [14], it can not still guarantee perfect se-
curity (i.e., unconditional security) against node
captures even after enhancing their scheme by
updating the keys for the regular sensor nodes in
assisting nodes after key establishment. Thus, it
introduces considerable computational overheads
for the assisting sensor nodes in order to update
those keys for better security. Another draw-
back of their scheme is that it does not support
dynamic regular sensor node addition after ini-
tial deployment. Addition of new regular sensor
nodes is extremely important for a sensor net-
work, because sensor nodes may be compromised
by an attacker or may be expired due to energy
consumption, and as a result, we always expect
to deploy some fresh nodes to join in the network
in order to continue security services.
To overcome the above aforementioned prob-
lems, we propose a new key pre-distribution
scheme suited for highly mobile sensor nodes.
As in [5], we make an assumption that a mobile
node is aware of its physical movement. After
each movement, a node will initiate a pairwise
key establishment procedure in its new physical
neighborhood.
Our scheme has the following interesting prop-
erties:
• It provides high network connectivity.
• It is unconditionally secure against node
captures. This means that no matter how
many nodes are compromised, an attacker
will never compromise secret communica-
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tions between non-compromised nodes in
the network.
• It requires minimal storage requirement for
storing a single key in each node’s memory.
• It supports dynamic node addition effi-
ciently after initial deployment.
3.2. Assumptions
We list the following basic assumptions as used
in [8] for developing our protocol:
• A1: We consider a wireless sensor network
consisting of two types of sensors: a small
number of High-end sensors (H-sensors) and
a huge number of Low-end sensors (L-
sensors). The H-sensors are equipped with
high power batteries, large memory stor-
ages and data processing capacities. They
can execute relatively complicated numeri-
cal operations. On the other hand, the L-
sensors are inexpensive and extremely re-
source constrainted (as in [10]). Each L-
sensor has limited battery power, memory
size, data processing capability and short
radio transmission range. For example, the
H-sensors can be PDAs and the L-sensors
are the MICA2-DOT motes [13].
• A2: H-sensors are equipped with tamper
resistant hardware. In practical applica-
tions, it is true since only a small number of
such nodes to be deployed in the network.
Thus, all the keying information stored in
each H-sensor will not be disclosed to an
attacker even if he captures any H-sensor
node in the network.
• A3: Due to cost constraints, L-sensors are
not equipped with tamper resistant hard-
ware. We assume that an attacker can
eavesdrop on all traffic, inject packets and
reply old messages previously delivered. We
further assume that if an attacker captures
an L-sensor node, all the keying information
it holds will also be compromised.
• A4: After deployment, we assume that
H-sensors will be static, whereas L-sensors
are highly mobile nodes in the network.
3.3. Notations
Following is the convention we use to describe
the protocol in this paper.
• u→ v : M refers to a messageM sent from
a node u to another node v.
• idu : the unique identifier of a sensor node
u, that is, a name of node u.
• MKu : the master key of a sensor node u
to be shared with the base station only.
• SK : the special key shared by all the H-
sensors and the base station.
• ku,v: a shared secret key between nodes u
and v.
• Ek(M) : a message M encrypted using key
k.
• MACk(M) : a message authentication code
(MAC) for the message M , under the key
k.
• PRFk(M) : output of a pseudo-random
function (PRF) for the message M , under
the key k.
• RNu : a random nonce generated by the
sensor node u. Nonce is a one-time random
bit-string, usually used to achieve freshness.
• A||B : data A concatenates with data B.
3.4. Protocol Description
The main idea behind our scheme is to de-
ploy a small number of additional H-sensor nodes
along with a large number of L-sensor nodes in
the network, so that H-sensors can help in pair-
wise key establishment procedure between sensor
nodes. The L-sensor nodes are to be deployed
randomly in a target field, whereas the H-sensor
nodes will be deployed to their expected loca-
tions. After deployment, sensor nodes will form
multi-hop infrastructure-less wireless communi-
cation between each other and finally communi-
cate with the base station. The base station is
most powerful node and it can be located either
at the center or at a corner of the target field. Let
m be the number of H-sensor nodes and n the
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number of L-sensor nodes where n >> m. For
convenience, we call the H-sensors as the auxil-
iary nodes because they will help for pairwise key
establishment procedure and the L-sensors as the
regular sensor nodes. Our protocol has the fol-
lowing phases.
3.4.1. Key Pre-Distribution Phase
This phase is done in offline by a key setup
server before deployment of the nodes in a target
field. It consists of the following steps:
• Step-1: For each auxiliary sensor node
ASi, the setup server assigns a unique iden-
tifier, say idASi . Similarly, for each regular
sensor node u, the setup server also assigns
a unique identifier, say idu.
• Step-2: The setup server randomly gener-
ates a special key SK which will be given to
all the auxiliary sensor nodes and the base
station.
• Step-3: For each deployed regular sensor
node u, the setup server randomly gener-
ates a master keyMKu which will be shared
with the base station only. This master key
is computed using the special key SK and
the identifier idu as MKu = PRFSK(idu),
where PRF is a pseudo random function
proposed by Goldreich et al. [11].
• Step-4: Finally, the setup server loads (i)
the identifier idASi and (ii) the special key
SK to the memory of each auxiliary sensor
node ASi. Each regular sensor node u is
loaded with the following information: (i)
its own identifier idu and (ii) its own master
key MKu before deployment.
3.4.2. Direct Key Establishment Phase
In this phase, we consider the following two
cases.
Case 1: Key establishment between regu-
lar sensor nodes
After deployment of the nodes, every regu-
lar sensor node discovers an auxiliary sensor
node in its communication range. If a regu-
lar sensor node u wants to establish a secret
pairwise key with its neighbor regular sen-
sor node v, node v will send a request to
its auxiliary node. Let ASi be an auxiliary
node discovered by the node v within its
neighborhood. Then the auxiliary node ASi
will generate a random key ku,v, create two
protected copies of it, one for u and other
for v, and send a reply containing these two
protected copies of ku,v to node v. Upon re-
ceiving such a reply from ASi, node v will
retrieve ku,v and forward other copy to u. u
will also retrieve ku,v. Finally, u and v will
store ku,v for their future secret communi-
cations.
This phase for establishing pairwise keys
between u and v is summarized below:
1. Node u generates a random nonce
RNu and sends the following message
to node v:
u→ v : (idu||RNu).
2. Node v also generates a random nonce
RNv and sends the following message
to its auxiliary node ASi:
v → ASi : T =(idu||idv||RNu||RNv) ||
MACMKv (T ).
3. The auxiliary node ASi first com-
putes the master key of v as MKv
= PRFSK(idv) and then computes
MACMKv (T ). If the computed MAC
and the received MAC are equal, v is
considered as a legitimate node. If
the authentication is successful, then
only the auxiliary node ASi computes
the master key of u as MKu =
PRFSK(idu). Finally, the auxiliary
node ASi generates a random key
ku,v and sends two copies of it, one
protected by MKu (for node u) and
another protected by MKv (for node
v) to node v as follows:
ASi → v : (EMKu (ku,v ⊕ idu ⊕
RNu), EMKv (ku,v ⊕ idv ⊕RNv)).
4. Node v decrypts EMKv (ku,v ⊕ idv ⊕
RNv) using its own master key MKv,
retrieves ku,v using its own identifier
and its own random nonce as ku,v =
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(ku,v ⊕ idv ⊕RNv) ⊕(idv ⊕RNv) and
forwards other protected copy of ku,v
to node u:
v → u : EMKu(ku,v ⊕ idu ⊕ RNu).
Similarly, after receiving the last message
from v, u retrieves ku,v using its own master
key MKu. The auxiliary sensor node ASi
discards the computed master keys MKu
(for regular sensor node u) as well as MKv
(for regular sensor node v) and the gener-
ated key ku,v from its memory. The spe-
cial key SK is secure, since the auxiliary
nodes are equipped with tamper resistant
hardware. Therefore, based on the secu-
rity of the PRF function [11], even an at-
tacker knows a master key of a captured
regular sensor node, it is computationally
infeasible to compute the special key SK.
We note that each auxiliary node acts as a
KDC. We also observe that the transaction
between two nodes is uniquely determined
by attaching the random nonce of a node in
the message by another node.
Case 2: Key establishment between aux-
iliary nodes and regular sensor nodes
In case, if a regular sensor node, say u wants
to establish a pairwise key with its neighbor
auxiliary node, say ASj , u simply sends a
request message containing its own identi-
fier idu to ASj . After receiving such request
from the node u, ASj generates a random
key ku,ASj . After that ASj computes the
master key of u using the special key SK
and the identifier idu of node u as MKu =
PRFSK(idu), makes a protected copy of
the generated random key as EMKu (ku,ASj )
and sends this to node u. After receiving
such a message, u decrypts this protected
key using its own master key MKu. In this
way, u and ASj will establish a pairwise
key and store this key for secret communi-
cations in future. The auxiliary sensor node
ASj also discards the computed master key
MKu for the node u from its memory.
3.4.3. Supplemental Key Establishment
Phase
Though our later analysis in Section 4.1 shows
that even for a small fraction of the auxiliary sen-
sor nodes it is possible to achieve a high probabil-
ity of establishing pairwise keys using our direct
key establishment phase, it is still possible that a
regular sensor node cannot find an auxiliary sen-
sor node in its neighborhood because the accu-
rate deployment of the auxiliary nodes in their ex-
pected locations may not be guaranteed in some
scenarios. In this situation, we have the supple-
mental key establishment phase. In this phase, a
regular sensor node discovers an auxiliary sensor
node that is no more than h hops away from itself.
This can be also easily achieved by having u’s
neighbors to help collecting the id of an auxiliary
node in their neighborhood. Once an auxiliary
sensor node is discovered, the remaining steps are
similar to the direct key establishment phase. We
note that the discovery and usage of an auxiliary
node using multiple hops introduces additional
communication overhead. However, we will show
in Section 4.1 that by using only one hop, it is
sufficient to achieve a very high probability of es-
tablishing pairwise keys between nodes. Also, the
need for this phase will not likely be invoked fre-
quently and hence we believe that this will not be
a big problem.
3.4.4. Dynamic Node Addition Phase
Sometimes nodes may be faulty due to battery-
energy consumption, malfunctioning, etc. or
compromised by an attacker by capturing the
nodes. Therefore, it is necessary to redeploy some
new sensor nodes to replace those faulty or com-
promised sensor nodes, or to deploy fresh nodes
in the sensor network.
In order to deploy a new regular sensor node
u, the key setup server has to generate a unique
identifier idu and a master key MKu which is
computed using the special key SK and the iden-
tifier idu asMKu = PRFSK(idu) and loads these
informations to its memory.
In order to deploy a new auxiliary sensor node,
say ASi, the key setup server assigns a unique
identifier, say idASi . After that the setup server
loads this identifier idASi and the previous spe-
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cial key SK which is already with all the deployed
auxiliary sensor nodes in the network.
After deployment of such new nodes in the net-
work, they establish pairwise keys using our direct
key establishment phase and if required, using the
supplemental key establishment phase. Thus, we
see that dynamic node addition in our protocol is
done efficiently.
4. Analysis of Our Scheme
In this section, we analyze the network con-
nectivity of our scheme i.e., the probability of es-
tablishing pairwise keys between neighbor nodes
in the network. We then analyze the resilience
against node capture. Finally, we discuss over-
heads required in our scheme in order to establish
pairwise keys between neighbor nodes.
4.1. Network Connectivity
For simplicity, we assume that nodes are evenly
distributed in the target field. Let m be the num-
ber of auxiliary sensor nodes and n the number
of regular sensor nodes in the target field. Let d
be the average number of neighbor nodes of each
node. Let u and v two neighbor nodes. We as-
sume that p denotes the overall probability that
any two neighbor nodes u and v can establish
a pairwise key between them in the direct key
establishment phase and p1 the probability of
establishing pairwise keys between two neighbor
sensor nodes u and v using one hop auxiliary
sensor node from v in the supplemental key es-
tablishment phase.
In order to establish a pairwise key between two
neighbor regular sensor nodes u and v, if u ini-
tiates a request to establish a pairwise key with
v, v is required to communicate with an auxil-
iary sensor node in its communication range. The
probability that an auxiliary node ASi is not in
the neighborhood of the regular sensor node v
can be estimated by 1− d
m+n . Since there are
m auxiliary nodes in the network, the probabil-
ity that the regular sensor node v fails to discover
any auxiliary node ASi in its neighborhood can be
estimated by
(
1− d
m+n
)m
. As a result, the prob-
ability of establishing a pairwise key between two
neighbor regular sensor nodes u and v is given by
p′ = 1−
(
1− d
m+ n
)m
. (1)
Since there are n regular sensor nodes and m
auxiliary sensor nodes in the network, the total
direct communication links is
∑
m+n
i=1
d
2 =
(m+n)d
2 ,
since there are d average number of neighbor
nodes for each node. We note from our direct key
establishment phase that each auxiliary node can
establish a secret key with its neighbor regular
sensor nodes. Since there are m auxiliary nodes
in the network, secure communication links due
to key establishment between auxiliary nodes and
their neighbor regular sensor nodes becomes md2 .
Again, we have another nd2 ×p′ secure links in the
network due to key establishment between regu-
lar sensor nodes with the help of auxiliary nodes.
As a result, we obtain (md2 +
nd
2 × p′) secure links
out of total (m+n)d2 links. Hence, the required
overall network connectivity is given by
p =
md
2 +
nd
2 × p′
(m+n)d
2
=
m+ n× p′
m+ n
. (2)
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the
probability p of establishing keys between neigh-
bor nodes versus the fraction of auxiliary sensor
nodes m
n
. From this figure, we observe that p in-
creases faster as d increases. Moreover, for a small
fraction of auxiliary sensor nodes m
n
, our scheme
also guarantees a high probability of establishing
keys between neighbor sensor nodes.
From the supplemental key establishment
phase, we notice that if a sensor node v can not
discover any auxiliary sensor node in its neigh-
borhood, it will discover an auxiliary sensor node
within h-hop range from it. Once an auxiliary
sensor node is discovered, v can establish a pair-
wise key with its neighbor node u. We now con-
sider the case h = 1. The probability that none of
the neighbors of v can discover an auxiliary sen-
sor node can be estimated by
((
1− d
m+n
)m)d
.
As a result, we have,
p1 = p+ (1 − p)×
(
1−
(
1− d
m+ n
)md)
. (3)
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Figure 1. Direct network connectivity p of our
scheme vs. the fraction of auxiliary sensor nodes
m
n
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Figure 2. Network connectivity p1 vs. the frac-
tion of auxiliary sensor nodes m
n
during one-
hop supplemental key establishment phase of our
scheme.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the
probability p1 of establishing pairwise keys be-
tween neighbor nodes versus the fraction of aux-
iliary sensor nodes m
n
. We note that once a regu-
lar sensor node discovers an auxiliary sensor node
within one-hop neighbors of it, the probability
of establishing pairwise keys between neighbor
nodes becomes very high. As a result, we observe
that one needs not to apply more than one-hop
supplemental key establishment phase after the
direct key establishment phase.
4.2. Resilience against Node Capture
The resilience against node capture attack of
a scheme is measured by estimating the fraction
of total secure communications that are compro-
mised by a capture of c nodes not including the
communication in which the compromised nodes
are directly involved. In other words, we want to
find out the effect of c sensor nodes being compro-
mised on the rest of the network. For example,
for any two non-compromised sensor nodes u and
v, we have to find out what is the probability that
the adversary can decrypt the secret communica-
tions between u and v when c sensor nodes are
already compromised ?
From our key pre-distribution phase described
in subsection 3.4.1, we see that each auxiliary sen-
sor node is given the special key SK. This special
key SK is secure, because all the auxiliary sensor
nodes are equipped with tamper resistant hard-
ware. As a result, based on the security of the
PRF function [11], it is computationally infeasi-
ble to recover the special key SK from the master
key MKu = PRFSK(idu) of a compromised reg-
ular sensor node u. We also notice from our direct
key establishment phase as well as supplemental
key establishment phase that each pairwise key
between nodes are generated randomly. Thus, no
matter how many nodes are captured, an attacker
knows nothing about the secret communications
between non-compromised nodes. In other words,
no matter how many nodes are captured, non-
compromised nodes can still communicate with
100% secrecy. In this way, our scheme guaran-
tees unconditional security against node captures
attack.
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4.3. Overheads
Our scheme only requires a single master key
MKu to be stored in each regular sensor node u
and the special key SK in each auxiliary sensor
node ASi.
Our scheme involves small computation over-
heads. A regular sensor node has to perform one
MAC operation and one symmetric key decryp-
tion.
We note from our direct key establishment
phase that the communication is in one-hop range
only. Though multi-hop communication will in-
troduce some communication overheads, we see
from our analysis that the supplemental key es-
tablishment can be done using only one-hop pro-
cedure. Moreover, such phase needs not to be in-
volved frequently, since direct key establishment
phase will ensure high network connectivity.
5. Simulation Results
In this section, we describe the simulation re-
sults of network connectivity of our scheme.
We have implemented our proposed scheme for
static networks as well as mobile networks. We
have considered the following parameters for sim-
ulation of network connectivity of our scheme as
follows:
• The number of regular sensor nodes in the
network is n = 5000.
• The number of auxiliary sensor nodes is
m ≤ 500.
• The average number of neighbor nodes for
each node is d = 80.
• The communication range of each sensor
node is ρ = 30 meters.
• The area A of the target field is taken so
that the maximum network size becomes
n = (d+1)×A
piρ2
.
We assume that the target field is a flat region.
The regular sensor nodes are randomly deployed
in the target field. For deployment of auxiliary
sensor nodes, we logically divide the target field
into c×c cells, where c = ⌈√m ⌉. For each cell, an
auxiliary sensor node is to be deployed randomly
in that cell.
In our simulation, we only consider the direct
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Figure 3. Simulation vs. analytical results of di-
rect network connectivity p of our scheme, with
n = 5000, m ≤ 500 and d = 80, under static
network.
key establishment phase in which if a regular sen-
sor node u wants to establish a pairwise key with
its neighbor regular sensor node v, node v will
send a request to an auxiliary sensor node within
its neighborhood. Once such an auxiliary sensor
node is discovered by v, nodes u and v establish
a pairwise key between them.
The simulation results versus the analytical
results of direct network connectivity p of our
scheme are plotted in Figure 3. In this figure,
we assume that all the nodes are static. From
this figure we observe that our simulation results
closely tally with the analytical results.
We have also simulated the direct network con-
nectivity p of our scheme under mobile environ-
ment. We assume that after deployment the aux-
iliary sensor nodes remain static, whereas the reg-
ular sensor nodes will be highly mobile. We have
considered that any regular sensor node can move
from its current location in the target field within
the range of twice its communication range. The
simulation results for mobile regular nodes are
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Figure 4. Simulation results of direct network
connectivity p of our scheme for mobile regular
sensor nodes under different situations, with n =
5000, m ≤ 500 and d = 80.
shown in Figure 4. From this figure, we see that
our scheme is much suitable for highly mobile sen-
sor networks, because no matter how many how
many regular sensor nodes are mobile in the net-
work, the overall network connectivity does not
degrade.
6. Comparison with Previous Schemes
In this section, we compare the performances
of our proposed method with those for the previ-
ous schemes, namely, the EG scheme [9], the q-
composite scheme [3], the polynomial-pool based
scheme [14] and the Dong and Liu’s scheme [6].
The reason for considering those schemes is that
there is no restriction in applying those schemes
on mobile sensor networks.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between
the fraction of compromised links between non-
compromised nodes versus the number of nodes
capture. For the EG scheme [9], the q-
composite scheme [3] and the polynomial-pool
based scheme [14], we assume that each node
has available storage of holding 200 cryptographic
keys in its memory. The network connectivity
probability p is taken as p = 0.33 with suitable
values of the parameters for the different schemes.
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Figure 5. Comparison of resilience against node
captures between different schemes. Pe(c) de-
notes the fraction of compromised links between
non-compromised sensor nodes after capturing c
sensor nodes in the network and p denotes the
probability of establishing pairwise keys between
neighbor sensor nodes.
We clearly see that our scheme provides signifi-
cantly much better security against node captures
than the EG scheme, the q-composite scheme and
the polynomial-pool based scheme. Moreover our
scheme has better security than the Dong and
Liu’s scheme.
In our proposed scheme, only a single master
key is stored in each regular sensor node and also
a single special key SK is stored in each auxiliary
node to achieve high performance. Thus, no mat-
ter how many sensor nodes are in the network, our
scheme requires only to store a single key, which
is extremely memory efficient for the large-scale
wireless sensor networks. In the Dong and Liu’s
scheme, though each regular sensor node needs to
store a single key, but each assisting node needs to
store all the hash images of keys of regular sensor
nodes. On the other hands, the EG scheme, the q-
composite scheme and the polynomial-pool based
scheme require considerable storage requirements
for achieving high network performances.
The existing schemes (the EG scheme, the q-
composite scheme and the polynomial-pool based
scheme) require considerable communication as
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well as computational overheads in order to es-
tablish pairwise keys between neighbor nodes. In
these schemes, the path key establishment proce-
dure is a complicated one and requires a lot of
communication and computational overheads. In
our scheme as well as Dong and Liu’s scheme,
only a few number of symmetric key operations
and PRF operations (in our scheme) or hash oper-
ations (in Dong and Liu’s scheme) are required in
order to establish a pairwise key between neigh-
bor nodes. Zhu et al. [18] pointed out that due
to the computational efficiency of PRF function,
the computational overhead of PRF function is
negligible. As a result, the actual computational
overhead is low in our scheme compared to that
for the Dong and Liu’s scheme.
7. Conclusion
We have proposed a new key pre-distribution
scheme suitable for highly mobile sensor nodes
with the help of additional auxiliary sensor nodes.
Our scheme provides very high network connec-
tivity than the previous schemes. Our scheme
always guarantees unconditional security against
node capture attack. It supports dynamic node
addition efficiently compared to the previous
schemes. Overall, our scheme has better trade-
off among network connectivity, security, storage,
communication and computation overheads com-
pared to those for the previous schemes. In addi-
tion, our scheme also works for any deployment
topology.
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